The most lasting legacy of the Soviet experience, more so than institutions that persist in the Russian Federation today or the mentalities of citizens of post-Soviet states, was its transformation of Eurasia from a rural continent into an urban one. Particularly after the Great Patriotic War, the landscape of Soviet urban spaces changed as countless rows of low-quality apartment housing sprung up and a uniform socialist urban culture appeared to be forming. However, how and why this urban revolution happened, and what effect it had on the psychological makeup of Soviet citizens, remains lesser known. Meanwhile, while scholars of urban history such as Jane Jacobs, Reyner Banham, Lewis Mumford, and Mike Davis have produced fascinating tracts and monographs on the "ecologies" of American urban spaceshow, in other words, human beings in various political systems have interacted with the built urban landscape around them -limited work has been done on similar processes and histories in the Soviet world beyond the technical literature of the Cold War era. In this paper, I attempt to provide the outlines of such a history with such an approach by analyzing how changes in the Soviet urban fabric from approximately 1932 to 1980s affected social life in Soviet cities and among Soviet families. Basing my argument on close readings of Soviet books on gradostroitel'stvo (urban construction, urban studies) as well as literature, and guided by the insights of the above-listed urbanist thinkers, I argue that changes in urban planning so altered the relationship between citizens, the Party, and History that the Soviet system lost key strengths that had emboldened it during the 1930s and 1940s. In particular, while new Soviet housing projects obviously raised the standard of living of a great portion of the population, in resolving the housing problem, they also dismantled the "stranger's gaze" -the everyday urban clashes that, enabled by denunciations and an efficient and brutal NKVDthat had dominated Soviet housing until then. Focusing on Magnitogorsk in the 1930s and a variety of new Soviet cities (Navoi, Dneprodzherzhinsk, etc.) to make this point, I argue that the Soviet system, in effect, built itself out of existence by building so much into existence. I also point to the possibility of rich transnational comparisons in this field in the future.
Magnitogorsk rose from the steppe in the early 1930s, one Tatar worker there "had never seen a staircase, a locomotive, or an electric light" before his arrival in Magnitogorsk, for "his ancestors for centuries had raised stock on the flat plains of Kazakhstan" (Scott, 1989, p. 16) . And in the 1950s, Soviet towns became perpetual construction sites as cranes erected thousands of khrushoby apartment buildings; between 1955 and 1964, the nation's housing stock almost doubled from 640 to 1182 million square meters (Hosking, 1993, p. 353) . The most lasting legacy of the Soviet system was not institutions like the Russian FSB or statelets such as Transnistria, but the archipelago of cities imposed on what had for all of human history been peasant lands.
These new Soviet cities that rose from the Russian Plain and Eurasian Steppe like Magnitogorsk, Dzerzhinsk, and Angarsk were often explicitly constructed as "socialist cities," as centers of a socialist civilization. As one Uzbek book had it, "the construction of new socialist cities was one of the specific conditions for the liquidation of the existing backwardness of Uzbekistan and its transition to socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development" (Zhukhrintdinov, 1982, p. 2) . There was only one problem: no one knew what socialist civilization was. If we want to understand how the Soviet system conceptualized and tried to build socialism, then a focused way to do so is to ask the question: what do shifts in the Soviet urban experience tell us about the changing ideas of what socialist civilization was? This essay is an attempt to answer that question by comparing life in Magnitogorsk and other 1930s Soviet cities with Soviet urban life after the war with a particular focus on the new Khrushchev and Brezhnev-era housing units. I am more interested in the urban and residential life of working people than in how the Soviet elite lived. A close comparison of the Soviet cities of the 1930s and those of the latter half of the 20th century will show that the logic of postwar Soviet cities changed the relationships between individuals, the Party, state, and History so that the ways of "living socialism" that had made the system strong in cities like Magnitogorsk no longer existed or were severely weakened. The Soviet system built socialism out of existence by trying to build socialism into existence.
In order to see how the urban design of postwar cities destroyed the social fabric that had made the Soviet system strong, I examine pre-and postwar cities through three areas of analysis. First, I compare the construction of Magnitogorsk with that of postwar cities: what was the point of building such cities? Second, I compare Magnitogorsk with postwar cities as resettlement projects: how did people come to these cities risen from the ground, how did their lives change there? Third, I compare the living spaces of prewar and postwar Soviet cities: where and how did people live, and how did residential structures lend themselves to manipulation by residents and local authorities? I then devote some space at the end of the essay to respond to three possible objections to my argument as well as to my overall approach.
In approaching postwar Soviet this way, I aim throughout to ask what it was in the prewar urban landscape that made the Soviet system strong and to analyze how the postwar socialist urban landscape weakened these institutions and practices that had made the Soviet system strong. Given the number and variety of cities in the Soviet Union, I have elected to argue my points more generally through examples from literature, history, and film rather than through a focused case study of one or two Soviet cities. At the same time, I attempt to provide as much cityspecific analysis as possible through the visual materials that accompany this essay.
In focusing on gradostroitel'stvo, Soviet urban ecologies, and by trying to place this all into a comparative context, I seek to speak to current trends in the historiography of the USSR. On the one hand, if questions of Soviet nationalities policy and, before that, high politics and political biography dominated much of the scholarship of the Soviet Union, in recent years scholars, under the influence of the so-called "spatial turn," have turned more to examine what has been called Russia's imperial geography of power (Adams, 2010; Baron, 2007; Buckler, 2007; Cvetowski, 2006; Rittersporn, Rolf, & Behrends, 2003; Rolf, 2006 Rolf, , 2010 Schlögel, 2003; Schlögel, Schenk, & Ackeret, 2007) . Often drawing on distinctions between "public spheres" and "private spheres" across societies, they pose the question: how, throughout history, have Russia's rulers devised methods of rule -whether in law, economic planning, ethnography, administrative divisions, or urbanism -to exercise their sovereignty across an enormous continental space? (Burbank, von Hagen, & Remnev, 2007) . On the other hand, other groups of scholars, more commonly associated with Central Asian Studies, have sought to place Russian Imperial and Soviet history in comparative international context in order to isolate precisely what made the Soviet experience unique (Burbank & Cooper, 2010; Edgar, 2004; Khalid, 2007; Kotkin, 2001b; Morrison, 2008; Northrop, 2004) . And still Soviet urbanism remains a relatively underexplored topic among these trends (Evans, 2004) .
Given the history of rich, informed, theoretically sophisticated scholarship on the history of urbanism of other regions, this represents a real loss. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, many intellectuals turned their attention to the unprecedented American suburban, exurban, and, later, posturban landscape emerging across the country, seeking to situate its rise in a universal history of cities (Baudrillard, 1988; Eco, 1986; Jacobs, 1961; Koolhaas, 1978; Mumford, 1961; Scott, 1988; Sessen, 1991) . If authors like Vladimir Paperny have drawn some attention to the logic of Stalinist urban planning, the great Soviet urban projects of the postwar years, while featuring a rich contemporary Russian-language architectural and technical literature, still lack their Lewis Mumford to interpret them (Paperny, 1985) . Likewise, if Paperny's recent idiosyncratic Mos Angeles has contemplated the possibility of comparing American and (post-) Soviet metropolises, it remains an outlier in a literature that has seen limited attempts to situate Soviet urbanism in an international comparative context (Paperny, 2009) . While the present essay does not yet seek to place Soviet urbanism into an international comparative context, I hope that in analyzing Soviet urban spaces as urban ecologiesbuilt spaces in which citizens derived, grew, or rejected certain values in interacting with and living in the built space around them -we might gain further perspective toward future studies of the postwar USSR.
I turn, first, to the construction of these two types of socialist cities, prewar and postwar. As concerns Magnitogorsk, what stands out is how the idea of constructing a socialist city out of nothing captured the imagination of so many. John Scott's 1942 Behind the Urals provides a good insight into the idealism of those who came to Magnitogorsk during the period. The doctor, for example, whom Scott describes in the book saw the construction of Magnitogorsk as a testament to the superior strength and will of workers to that of their former capitalist masters. Commenting on the fact that neither industry nor the Tsarist Government "had ever undertaken to project a UralKuznetsk metallurgical base," the doctor draws the moral: "too large and difficult for the capitalists, the task was left to the workers." (Scott, 1989, p. 63) . In the doctor's view, the conquest of the steppe becomes, more than just a practical matter, a means through which Soviet workers can assert their identity as subjects and not objects of history. The doctor's language supports this view. He describes the construction of a Ural metallurgical base not as a choice made by the workers but rather as a task "left to" them, as if the construction of metallurgical facilities were a historical necessity waiting to be realized by the right actors. Even if one finds this reading of the Magnitogorsk doctor in a book that speaks of the "historical issues at stake" in Russian history a stretch, it is clear that for Scott Magnitogorsk was less a mere city than a new society in which every worker had a real investment (Scott, 1989, p. 61) . "I was," wrote Scott, "going to be one of many who cared not to own a second pair of shoes, but who built blast furnaces which were their own" (Scott, 1989, p. 5) . Scott saw in the city not just "a magnificent plant built" but also "much sweat and blood, many tears" (Scott, 1989, p. 6) . The construction of Magnitogorsk, as Scott saw it, was nothing less than a battle of total mobilization:
In Magnitogorsk I was precipitated into a battle. I was deployed on the iron and steel front. Tens of thousands of people were enduring the most intense hardships in order to build blast furnaces, and many of them did it willingly, with boundless enthusiasm, which infected me from the day of my arrival (Scott, 1989, pp. 5-6) .
The point here is that many saw the construction of 1930s Soviet cities not on its own terms but as a worldhistorical mission or the realization of utopia. When Joshua Kunitz witnessed the building of Stalinabad in the Tajik SSR, this scholar of literature took care with his words as he described the event as a "Gargantuan task" (Kunitz, 1935, p. 241) . He was right: as the graphic from the 1980 book The Planning of New Cities on the next page shows, the construction of Soviet cities like Navoiy in the Uzbek SSR, Karaganda in the Kazakh SSR, or Norilsk and Magnitogorsk in the Russian SSR was an affair largely confined to the steppe. Settlers like Kunitz, Scott, and Sluchak, a Belorussian Jew from Gomel come to administer the construction of Stalinabad, had arrived at the frontier. And many of them, as Kunitz suggested, had found their own earthly Abbey of Thélème in these construction sites in the steppe (Fig. 1) .
But if the construction of the Soviet cities of the 1930s invited comparisons with Rabelaisian utopias and the promise of "world-historical lives," the construction of postwar Soviet cities inspired only ridicule and criticism. As pre-fabricated housing shipped in on trucks replaced the hard-won shelters from the elements that surrounded Magnetic Mountain, the construction of socialist civilization ceased to be gripping. The animated introduction to the popular 1975 Soviet film Irony of Fate, for example, depicts a Soviet architect who seeks approval for an attractive residential complex, but each layer of bureaucracy strips away design features until his ambitious project is reduced to a nine-story variant of the standard five-story khrushchovka (Ironiia sud 'by, 1975) . The bestiary of regulatory stamps hypnotizes the architect; he becomes an architectural Napoleon. He marches around the world, wearing a bicorn made of newspapers as he honks out orders for khrushchovki to be built everywhere -on beaches, in the ocean, at ski resorts, and in the desert, with zero concern for site-specificity. Soon, armies of fully built khrushchovki wearing army boots march into the sites and make themselves at home. It would be hard to argue that these building sites were places where "everything was full of thrills and romance" (Kunitz, 1935, p. 235) . While the Magnitogorsk doctor, John Scott, and Kunitz' Tajik acquaintances believed that they were building a civilization ex nihilio, Irony of Fate suggests that the installation of pre-fabricated housing actually destroys the "placeness" of a place. The very first lines of the film describe this process of construction as destruction that befell the villages-cum khrushchovki sites surrounding Moscow whose names inspired future constructed cities:
The villages surrounding Moscow -Proparevo, Chermanovo, Medvedkovo, Belyayevo, Bogorodskoye, and, of course, Cheremushki -did not suspect that they could discover immortality in those same sorrowful days when they were forever wiped off the face of the earth (Ironiia sud'by) (Fig. 2) .
Irony of Fate may be a comedy film, but it derives its popularity from its insight into the absurdities and contradictions of later Soviet architecture. By the 1950s and 1960s, indeed, Soviet architects and city planners seem to have lost the confidence that their architecture represented a new and ascendant civilization. A comparison of the construction strategies of Stalinabad and the postwar city of Navoiy, both in the Uzbek SSR, is illustrative: while contemporary observers of the construction of Stalinabad boasted that it was the only capital city in the world, let alone "the dark depths of Asia," with no church, mosque, or synagogue, the designers of Navoiy's central plaza diluted their architecture with Uzbek influences. Where had the confidence in socialist civilization gone? (Kunitz, 1935, p. 243) . This sentiment also found expression in the October 1988 Lithuanian Sajudis Program, which demanded "implementation of a housing construction policy which would correspond to the cultural and historical traditions of Lithuania" (Furtado & Chandler, 1992, p. 149) . These demands reflected resentment toward the imposition of Slavic culture on the Lithuanian SSR, but they also spoke to the deficit of imagination in postwar Soviet civilization building. If standardized socialist housing failed to capture the imagination as part of a new and better civilization, then it had no right to exist (Figs. 3 and 4 ).
Yet more than vessels for the imagination, Soviet cities were part of a resettlement project that would give the world's first socialist society an urban proletariat and turn the scions of steppe-dwelling families into urbanites. Or were they centers of a new, more consumerist socialist civilization? Just what the point of people moving to cities was changed greatly in the Soviet Union from the 1930s to the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era. In the case of Magnitogorsk, John Scott summed it up when he described the city's population in 1933 as "Communists, kulaks, foreigners, Tatars, convicted saboteurs, and a mass of blueeyed Russian peasants" (Scott, 1989, p. 92) . The socialist city was, in Scott's view, a place for rural inhabitants of Eurasia to take part in a pageant of modernization. For some, like the Tatar Shaimat Khaibulin, whose "life had changed more in a year [at Magnitogorsk] than that of his antecedents since the time of Tamerlane," (Scott, 1989, p. 19) Scott's wife, Masha, the daughter of barefoot peasants near Tver, the move was voluntary (Scott, 1989, pp. 120-121) . For others, like Shabkov, a former Russian kulak sentenced to five years' time at Magnitogorsk, it was not (Scott, 1989, p. 18) . And yet the move to the city represented the chance for incredible social mobility (Khaibulin and Masha), to learn how to read (all three), to learn integral calculus (Masha), or even to "expiate one's crimes in honest labor" (Shabkov) while taking part in the construction of a utopia, where "we'll all have automobiles and there won't be any differentiation between kulaks and anybody else." Consumerist dreams (automobiles) may have played some role in individuals' hopes for the future of the Soviet city in the 1930s, but these desires were subordinated to a larger narrative of generational mobility and participation in a historic event.
By the 1960s and 1970s, however, a majority of the Soviet population had settled in cities, and the spirit of mobilization and generational mobility had been replaced by complacency and consumerism. It is true that postwar projects like the Virgin Lands Campaign, the kukuruza plan, and even the deployment of "liquidators" to Chernobyl mobilized tens of thousands of Soviet citizens across Eurasia. Unlike Magnitogorsk, however, these "harebrained schemes" failed to remake the steppe in a meaningful way (4 million hectares of destroyed Kazakh land aside), or were prompted by other catastrophes (famines and the Chernobyl disaster) (Hosking, 1993, pp. 357, 478) . At the same time, new technologies like tape recorders and X-ray plates and a lack of restrictions on consumer culture meant that Western icons from Levi's Jeans to schlock rock bands could compete for the time and imagination of Soviet citizens (Kotkin, 2001a, p. 43) . Gone were hermeneutical debates about the national question in Marxism-Leninism; in were graffiti wars about the merits of punk music versus heavy metal (Kunitz, 1935, p. 220) . People had more of a stake in what brand of jeans they wore than in the kind of civilization they were to build (Kotkin, 1995, p. 184) . And it was getting harder to link Western culture with militarism or racism, as was par for the course at Magnitogorsk's cinema. How was even the most talented propagandist to discredit bootlegged Deep Purple LPs? (Dimitry Medvedev has stated that Deep Purple was among his favorite bands growing up in Leningrad in the late 1970s and early 1980s.) Increased ownership of television sets and refrigerators unhinged peoples' expectations from those of their parents' generation. The most striking thing, for example, in M.F.'s letter to Argumenty i fakty is not that an engineer failed to find an affordable apartment but rather that he felt that he had the right to own a dwelling he had not built with his own hands (McKay, 1991, pp. 7-8) .
Construction site, resettlement project: Soviet cities were both of these and more, but most basically, they were living spaces. Here, too, the shifts in Soviet urban design reveal much about the growing weaknesses of the Soviet system. The crowding of Soviet living spaces in the early 20th century is well known. The satirist Mikhail Zoschenko wrote in his 1925 "The Crisis" of a family of three forced to live in the bathroom of an alreadycrowded apartment (Zoschenko, 1963, pp. 137-140) and in the same year Vyacheslav Shishkov wrote "The Divorce," in which a divorced couple has to continue to sleep in the same bed for want of spare housing (Shishkov, 1964, pp. 143-148) . But the crowding of Soviet living spaces was no laughing matter. As total strangers were forced to live with one another, disputes and cruelty were common. "Every wretched little sign of civilizationa radio, plumbing, the telephone, the bath, electricity, everything created for a little comfort, is transformed by the tenants into a weapon of torture with which they torment and hound each other to death," wrote a former communal apartment dweller in a fictional account (Kotkin, 1995, p. 479) . A Soviet émigré interviewed on communal apartment life said that divorcees, in an effort to force their ex-spouse out of the living space, often organized "very noisy, smoky, and drink-filled" parties, and "if the ex-wife had by that time not yet decided to move out, the man would bring in women" (Geiger, 1968, p. 209) .
And yet the real tragedy of the common space was not this "loneliness of being together" (odinochestvo vdoem) but rather the way the Soviet system, at least under the leadership of Stalin, turned these grudges into a form of government (Akhmatova, 1934) . Jan Gross' study of the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland is telling. As several of the testimonies from occupied voivodeships show, the real power of the Soviet system came from its placing the instruments of terror at the hands of anyone with a dispute to settle. In the words of one inhabitant of the region, "whoever had a grudge against somebody else, an old feud, who had another as a grain of salt in his eye -he had a stage to show his skills, there was a cocked ear, willing to listed. Posters encouraged people to bring denunciations" (Gross, 1988, pp. 119-120) . One major source of power for the Soviet system, however, was not just its placing the secret police at the hands of individuals with petty grievances (as Gross argues) but also the crisis atmosphere that surrounded Soviet housing well into the 1950s and that itself fueled and stoked these grievances. This was the ironic power of the Soviet system: the failure of the regime to solve the housing question was itself a success. The more crowded, annoying, and uncomfortable Soviet housing was, the more grounds for denunciations there were. Lust for a neighbor's spouse, envy on the job, or jealousy of a colleague's fur hat existed outside of communal apartments, of course, but was it not easier to denounce someone who chopped wood in common areas, who stole windows from the kitchen in a freezing climate, who "reeked intolerably of cats?" (Bulgakov, 1968, p. 117) .
By replacing its old living spaces with more individual apartments the Soviet system liquidated its own source of power. It is true that the Soviet regime under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, the gerontocrats, or even Gorbachev never really solved the housing crunch in the Soviet Union, but improvements had been made: letters like Zamsha's from Rostov on the Don complain less about smelly strangers than about the fact that single parents were entitled to only a one bedroom apartment (McKay, 1991, p. 10) . This may seem like a small difference, but the more the Soviet system housed its citizens with family members rather than total strangers and granted them more living space, the more it did away with the obnoxiousness of communal life from which it had derived much of its power. The amount of living space per person had improved, after all. The amount of living space per person in Magnitogorsk ranged between 1.9 square meters in 1931 to 3.89 square meters in 1935, and never did this figure rise about 4 m per person in the decade (Kotkin, 1995, p. 161) . By the late 1980s, however, L. Alyoshina in Makeyevka was splitting a 41 square meter three-room apartment with her child, her exhusband, and his parents, or 8.2 square meters per person (McKay, 1991, pp. 8-9) . More than that, however, the more people lived with family members, the more they blamed their grievances about living space on the government rather than their living mates. Gone was Sharikov (of Heart of a Dog) threatening to shoot his flat mates over his right to sixteen square arshin (about twelve square meters) and the days of residential kto-kovo (Bulgakov, 1968, p. 117) ; in was V.A. of Tomsk claiming in Argumenty i Fakty that the state-declared right to nine square meters of living space was a lie and neighbors making jokes about Brezhnev at the kitchen table (McKay, 1991, p. 10) (Fig. 5) .
This argument has wide-reaching implications for how the Soviet system functioned. More impressive than the big KGB of the 1970s and 1980s that assigned 50 agents to one poet were the smaller secret police empires of the Stalinist years that had no need for so many agents because of their armies of upravdomy. Likewise, while it is true that there existed a paucity of physical spaces for organized opposition in the Soviet Union compared to, say, Poland, a country that enjoyed a more lively anti-Communist opposition Fig. 5 . The gaze of the stranger eliminated, with separate spaces for work, leisure, and sleep. "Zhilaya komnata v odnokomnatoi kvartire dlia semye na triokh chelovek," Entsiklopedia domashnovo khoziastva, c. 1960s. movement, this analysis misses the point. Jokes about Brezhnev's drool at the kitchen table or the bar -common in the late USSR -were trivial compared to meetings at Catholic churches and Flying Universities, but the real point here is not that the new Soviet spaces were ill-suited for organized socialist opposition but rather that they were illsuited to generating the "loneliness of being together" that the Soviet system had thrived on. It is true that the 1960s and 1970s saw mental hospitals fill up with members of Helsinki Watch Groups, but the fact that the regime now relied on medical "professionals" like Dr. Lunts rather than apartment-dwellers to quell dissent showed how things had changed (Hosking, 1993, pp. 424-425) . These "reinforced-concrete nightmare houses," as one Soviet citizen charitably put it, may have wasted 50 million tons of steel, they may have cost the Union 700 billion rubles (the same as the war), but they put walls in front of that jealous and cruel "stranger's gaze" that had dominated Soviet residential life to that point (McKay, 1991, pp. 120-121; Kotkin, 1995, p. 157) . Indeed, even within the home, the move was to put up more walls. Soviet architectural reformers in the 1950s increasingly concerned with byt (roughly, daily life) proposed that even the living room of one-bedroom threeperson apartments, like the one pictured below, be divided into several spaces for work, entertainment, and sleep. The stranger's gaze, so important to the Soviet system, had been blinded. Now that I have laid out my case for an urban-centric analysis of the Soviet system, I want to respond to three possible objections. The first is that my analysis underrates the role that "socialism with a human face" played in undermining the system. In fact, the arguments I have offered about Soviet urbanism supplement and complicate, rather than contradict, this narrative. I agree that reform socialism was destabilizing; half-censorship was near-impossible in the Soviet system. People inevitably wanted more freedom until communist monopoly was found illegitimate.
However, to this I would add that "socialism with a human face" was liquidationist, not only for this reason, but also because it failed to understand how a spirit of salvific construction, total physical mobilization, social mobility, and living spaces, too, were central to the Soviet system. Not shock workers going to build one of the world's biggest steel mills, but 200 million people watching the 1989 Congress of People's Deputies on television; activism not through taking a bullet in the chest and going on to liquidate kulaks in Ukraine, but through complaining in Argumenty i fakty about the local Communist Party official cheating in dog shows: this was the world of socialism with a human face (McKay, 1991, p. 42 ). Idealism, not cynicism, may have been widely held in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, but there was a difference between the idealism of the 1930s and the 1960s. The former thought one had to build socialism while the latter thought one could legislate it or watch it on TV (Fig. 6) .
Another possible objection to my essay is that my arguments about the destruction of the stranger's gaze rely on an oversimplification of residential life under Stalin. All of my analysis of domestic life, the objection would go, assumes that overstuffed barracks and kommunalki were the only forms of residential life under Stalin in the USSR; the residential life of Magnitogorsk, one might assert, was an atypical case in Soviet history. One could point out that in some ways domestic architecture was more comfortable under Stalin than under Khrushchev: while some Stalinist kommunalki tolerated the existence of a central stolovaya (dining room) that was decorated as such and permitted communal meals, the apartments of the Khrushchev-era often did away with the dining room, permitting meals only in kitchens that in cases had only fold-down tables. The idea here is that Stalinist residential architecture and regulations permitted its inhabitants some modicum of control over their life (in the decoration of the dining room), while architecture under Khrushchev sought to destroy any sense of mealtime ritual, forcing Soviet citizens to tie their food consumption to its production by eating in the kitchen.
While I cannot object that this theory was true in some cases, such as that pictured below, I do not think this is a serious argument for the reason that an overwhelming amount of primary sources suggest that residential life under Stalin was indeed crowded and cruel. What did byt even mean to the twelve families living in 40 square meter dugouts in the Kirov mines? (Zubkova, 1998, p. 103) . Khrushchev-era architecture may have sought to collapse the dining room into the kitchen, but had not Stalinist architecture and communalization already forced the collapse of one family's entire living space into a communal bathroom? (Zoschenko, 1963, pp. 137-140) . "Eat in the bedroom, read in the examination room, dress in the waiting room, operate in the maid's room, and examine patients in the dining room": this, as the Moscow housing agents in Heart of a Dog explain to Philip Philippovich, was what byt meant in even the best of Moscow housing in the era of Stalin (Bulgakov, 1968, pp. 26-27) . The increased emphasis on byt in the 1950s may be an interesting story, but this argument is too clever for its own good (Fig. 7) .
Still another objection to my essay, this one more methodological, is that I have not focused enough on the actual layout of Soviet cities. I concede that for reasons of space, the scope of this essay, and the available primary sources, my focus has been on the construction, settlement, and habitation of Soviet cities rather than their design. Indeed, I could have written an entirely different essay on the differences in layout between the core of, just to take one example, Magnitogorsk and Pripyat, a city built in the Ukrainian SSR in 1970. The spatial relations of Magnitogork's core reflect those of power in the city at the time: "a weighty factory administration, a lofty party administration, and a lowly soviet, situated around a central square that was presided over by Stalin," all while the NKVD building looms over the entire scene from its perch atop a hill nearby. As Stephen Kotkin rightly points out in his analysis of the space, "the layout and architecture of Magnitogorsk's administrative agencies expressed a complicated system of authority [.] all three organizations existed in an uneasy relationship with each other" (Kotkin, 1995, 289) .
And what dominates Pripyat's central square, itself bereft of a monument not only to Stalin but also to Lenin? Not the city soviet but a department store; not the Chernobyl Atomic Energy Complex administration but the Palace of Culture "Energy"; not the NKVD but a hotel. And if the numerous sketches of the town made by former residents are true, there was not even an official KGB office anywhere in town, either. The landscape of postwar Soviet cities shows indeed how much the Soviet system liquidated socialism by attempting to build it. From Solihorsk in the Belorussian SSR to Dneprodzerzhinsk in the Ukrainian SSR to Algarsk near Lake Baikal, there are dozens of examples I could have analyzed in this way. As even this quick comparison of Magnitogorsk and Pripyat shows, analyzing the spatial organization of Soviet cities can be a productive analytical tool, but I chose not to take that route in this essay because of the general scope of the assignment and the dearth of technical sources available on any one particular city (Figs. 8 and 9 ). "Why, why did I cry?" asked one Moscow woman in the mid 1950s, reflecting on her reactions to Stalin's death. "I don't know, but perhaps it was this -it was with him that we won the war, with him that we built so much" (Boffa, 1959, p. 38) . Constructing a new non-capitalist modernity on top of the idiocy of rural life was a major goal and-as this woman realized-accomplishment of the Soviet system, and yet this quest failed. It failed because Soviet planners and architects, to say nothing of the housing needs that the "defeat in victory" of the Great Fatherland War presented, turned city building from a world-historical task into a practical one. It failed because the incredible social mobility that Soviet cities had brought one generation of former Eurasian steppe dwellers made the next generation more complacent about what they owed the Soviet system, and because the appearance of both Western and Soviet consumer goods changed peoples' idea of civilization from a just city into Levi's jeans and Nike basketball shoes. And it failed because much of the Soviet system's power stemmed from the chaos, cramming, and stranger's gaze of prewar housing, and because the prerequisites for a totalitarian state were liquidated by postwar housing.
And yet while both Magnitogorsk and postwar Soviet cities corresponded to the dreams and housing needs of their own times, the lessons on power that the construction, settlement, and dwellings of these two kinds of cities have to offer are timeless. From the Republic to More's Utopia to modern planned cities like Levittown, Brasília, and Chandigarh, this quest for the ideal planned city had deep roots that still grow. The Soviet system failed indeed to produce a non-capitalist urban modernity that enhanced the system's strengths, but the problems this quest for socialist civilization ran into are less a cause for celebration than a lesson bequeathed by the Soviet project to all great powers present and future.
